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CRITERIA FOR A COMPREHENSIVE
STRATEGY FOR NUCLEAR
ARMS CONTROL
Walter F. Mondale *
Every generation of Americans has its own special challenge. For
one it was the task of eliminating slavery, for another it was meeting
the threat of Hitler, for another it was finally standing up to the issue of
civil rights and addressing the problems of social and economic injus-
tice. Our generation's challenge is just as important: bringing nuclear
weapons under control by reducing their number and eventually elimi-
nating them entirely.
The special challenge of this generation is an obligation that we owe
to our children. It is a requirement of our defense and national secur-
ity. It is a moral imperative of our age. And it is America's role to lead
the world in this effort.
If our nation does not lead the world toward arms control, it will
not be done. For the civilized nations to rescue the boat people, it took
the Americans to lead.' It took our nation to speak out to further the
cause of human rights.2 To achieve peace in the Middle East between
the Egyptians and Israelis, it took American initiative. For the earth
to be free from the possibility of a nuclear nightmare, it is American
leadership which must bring about successful arms talks.
This requires, above all else, the deep commitment of our President
to serious arms negotiations. The most solemn responsibility of a Pres-
ident is to manage wisely our nuclear arsenals. He must keep us strong
to deter war, but also use that strength to ensure that these dreadful
weapons never are used. Since the dawn of the atomic age, every
Walter F. Mondale is Of Counsel to the Chicago-based law firm of Winston & Strawn. He
served as the Attorney General of Minnesota from 1960 to 1964; as U.S. Senator from Min-
nesota from 1964 until 1976; and as Vice President of the United States from 1977 to 1981.
He is the author of THE ACCOUNTABILITY OF POWER: TOWARD A RESPONSIBLE PRESIDENCY
(1975) and numerous articles.
I. President Carter approved a refugee policy that permitted the admission of all Vietnamese
"boat people" refused asylum elsewhere and of those Indochinese in refugee camps who
have close family and political ties to the United States. N.Y. Times, March 1, 1978, at 1,
col. 6. President Carter later ordered American ships to pick up refugees who fled Indochina
in boats. The decision was prompted by an abrupt rise in May and June of 1978 of the
number of "boat people." The United States hoped other countries would now be en-
couraged to take similar action. N.Y. Times, July 6, 1978, at 7, col. 1.
2. See 30th Anniversary of the Universal Declaration o/Human Rights, 79 DEP'T ST. BULL. I
(1979).
3. For an excellent and complete analysis of the United States' role in the Egypt-Israel peace
negotiations, see Egypt and Israel Sign Treaty ofPeace, 79 DEP'T ST. BULL. 1 (1979).
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American President has conscientiously worked to fulfill this
responsibility.
.President Truman had his Baruch Plan to control the uses of nu-
clear power.' President Eisenhower proposed general disarmament
and started test ban talks.' President Kennedy concluded the limited
Test Ban Treaty.6 President Johnson concluded the nuclear non-
proliferation treaty and began the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
(SALT) with the Soviet Union.7 President Nixon continued these talks
and concluded the first SALT treaty which ended the race to build anti-
ballistic missiles and set limits on the number of offensive strategic
arms.' President Ford achieved the Vladivostok Accords and initiated
limits on weapons-grade materials distribution.' President Carter con-
cluded SALT 1 ° and began negotiations designed to curb the develop-
ment of anti-satellite weapons,"I limit the spread of conventional
4. "Baruch Plan" was the name given to the United States' policy on nuclear power as stated by
the United States' representative to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, Ber-
nard M. Baruch, in New York City, June 14, 1946. 14 DEP'T ST. BULL. 1057 (1946).
5. See, e.g., Eisenhower's Statement on Disarmament Presented at the Geneva Conference,
PuB. PAPERS 713 (July 21, 1955).
6. Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in The Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under
Water, October 10, 1963, United States - Great Britain - Soviet Union, 14 U.S.T. 1313,
T.I.A.S. No. 5433.
7. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, openedfor signature July 1, 1968, 21
U.S.T. 483, T.I.A.S. No. 6839, 729 U.N.T.S. 161.
8. On May 20, 1971, President Nixon announced "The governments of the United States and
the Soviet Union. . . have agreed to concentrate this year on working out an agreement for
the limitation of the deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems (ABMs). They have also
agreed that, together with concluding an agreement to limit ABMs, they will agree on certain
measures with respect to the limitation of offensive strategic weapons." Remarks Announc-
ing an Agreement on Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, PuB. PAPERS 648 (May 20, 1971).
These talks became two treaties: Treaty Between the United States of America and the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, May
26, 1972, United States-U.S.S.R., 23 U.S.T. 3437, T.I.A.S. No. 7503; and Interim Agree-
ment Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on
Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, May 26, 1972,
United States-U.S.S.R., 23 U.S.T. 3463, T.I.A.S. No. 7504.
9. Text of the Joint United States-Soviet Communique issued at the conclusion of President
Ford's visit to Vladivostok, U.S.S.R., 10 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1494 (Nov. 24, 1974).
10. The SALT II Treaty was signed at Vienna, Austria, on June 18, 1979. See Treaty Between the
United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of
Strategic Offensive Arms, Art, XV Hearings Be/ore the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) [hereinafter cited as SALT11 Hearings].
11. See N.Y. Times, May 18, 1980, at D3.
The United States asked the Soviet Union to begin negotiations on banning hunter-killer
satellites. N.Y. Times, Mar. 19, 1978, at 1, col. 1. The talks started in Helsinki, Finland on
June 8, 1978. The discussions were led by Paul C. Warnke, head of the United States Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency, and Oleg Khlestov of the Soviet Union. The talks con-
cluded on June 17, 1978 with an agreement to continue at an unspecified date in the future.
N.Y. Times, June 18, 1978, at 8, col. 1. This date never came. In June of 1979, the Soviet
Union called for a halt in American development of the space shuttle, virtually ruling out the
possibility of any accord limiting anti-satellite weapons. N.Y. Times, June 1, 1979, at 6, col.
1.
The Reagan Administration has called for major increases in funds for military equip-
ment for orbital operations, including development of two systems for destroying enemy
satellites. N.Y. Times, March 20, 1981, at 13, col. I.
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arms,12 and strengthen curbs on the distribution of weapons-grade ma-
terial to slow the dawn of the plutonium age.' 3 Every presidential ad-
ministration since the devastation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki has
joined the bipartisan tradition of negotiating controls on the develop-
ment, deployment, and spread of these awful weapons-until the Rea-
gan administration.' 4
THE CURRENT STATUS OF ARMS CONTROL EFFORTS
It was not until May 1982 that President Reagan finally came for-
ward with an arms reduction proposal.' 5 Although I welcome this
demonstration of his interest in arms control, it is unfortunate that it
took sixteen months from the time of his inauguration for this to hap-
pen. Because of this delay we have not created the climate of coopera-
tion so helpful to successful arms talks. At the same time, the
Administration has made it easier to export weapons-grade material,' 6
announced the production of the neutron bomb,'7 and restarted con-
12. The U.S.S.R. agreed to begin formal talks in Washington on limiting Soviet and American
sales of conventional arms. N.Y. Times, Nov. 25, 1977 at 9, col. 1.
On December 15, 1977, U.S. and Soviet negotiations opened a preliminary meeting in
Washington on questions of international arms trade. N.Y. Times, Dec. 15, 1977 at 7, col. 1.
In May 1978, the U.S. and U.S.S.R. agreed to hold regular talks to curb the arms trade.
The talks were to deal with measures to engage other supplier countries to limit international
transfer of conventional arms. N.Y. Times, May 12, 1978 at 10, col. 3.
By April 1979, a report by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee found President
Carter's policy of reducing arms sales abroad as "running out of time" and his efforts to get
the U.S.S.R. to agree to a formula for restraint in arms sales "may be on the brink of fail-
ure." N.Y. Times, April 16, 1979 at 2, col. 3.
13. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-242, 92 Stat. 120 (1978). This act
stated as its purpose: "To provide for more efficient and effective control over the prolifera-
tion of nuclear explosive capability." This act provided criteria and procedures governing
export and overseas handling and transfer of U.S. nuclear material and technology.
14. While American negotiations in Geneva for months have attempted to strike an arms reduc-
tlon agreement with the Soviet Union, they have yet to succeed in coming to any accord with
the Soviets. Both the Americans and the Soviets have taken hard line stands on their respec-
tive positions. President Reagan's stand of "strength before compromise" is best illustrated
in recent remarks he made in Topeka, Kansas:
Yes, we have stepped up Defense Spending. At the same time, we now have teams in
Geneva, Switzerland, who are negotiating with the Soviet Union for outright reduc-
tion in nuclear weapons. Nuclear freeze, yes-after we have reduced the number of
weapons in the world and reduced the Soviet Union to no more than we, ourselves,
have.
18 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 1122 (Sept. 9, 1982).
15. Address Delivered by President Reagan During Commencement Exercises at Eureka Col-
lege, 18 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 599 (May 9, 1982). [hereinafter Speech at Eureka].
16. Although the Reagan Administration has made no changes in the federal regulations regard-
ing export limits of weapons-grade materials, 10 C.F.R. pt. 110 (1982), several policy changes
have been made which have had the effect of making it easier to export weapons-grade
materials: (I) President Reagan has dropped a policy implemented by the Carter Adminis-
tration that the Presidentpersonali sign any export request over 15 kilograms. (2) President
Carter would allow no new commitments to supply nuclear materials to anyone; only ex-
isting commitments would be honored. Although President Reagan has expressed concern
about the spread of nuclear weapons, he has dropped the "no new commitments" policy
where the request is for the use of nuclear electrical power. (3) President Carter discontinued
the reprocessing of spent fuel. President Reagan dropped this policy, recommencing such
things as the start up of the Clinch River Breeder reactor. Telephone interview with Nr. Neil
Moore, Senior Licensing Manager, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, (Nov. 10, 1982).
17. N.Y. Times, Aug. 9, 1981, at 1.
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struction of the plutonium-producing Clinch River Breeder Reactor.' 8
Executive branch officials have spoken of the possibility of winning a
nuclear war, fighting a limited nuclear war, and the firing of nuclear
"warning shots." 9 And, of course, this Administration has rejected the
SALT II Treaty.2 °
Underlying these attitudes are several arguments which must be
countered:
(1) the United States strategic forces are inferior to the Soviet Union's
arsenal;
(2) we could win an arms race with the Soviet Union;
(3) the Russians do not deserve arms control; and
(4) a nuclear war is winnable.
The Myth of Inferiority
President Reagan has recently asserted that our strategic forces are
inferior to those of the Soviet Union.2' From my experience, I know
this is not the actual situation. I not only participated in practically
every arms control and weapons judgment made over the last sixteen
years, but for four years I contributed to every basic decision of the
National Security Council, saw all the secrets, and all the estimates of
the Soviet forces.22 This experience has led me to believe that the
United States nuclear forces are superior to the Soviet nuclear forces in
many ways. Many facts available to the general public support this
belief. We have nine thousand deliverable warheads in our strategic
forces today; the Soviets have approximately seven thousand.23 Our
targeting systems are more sophisticated and, consequently, our ICBM
18. N.Y. Times, Mar. 10, 1981, at BI0, col. I.
19. Partial transcript of an interview with George Bush, conducted by Robert Sheer of The Los
Angeles Times, N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1980, at 27. Presidential Counselor Edwin Meese re-
cently said that nuclear war is, "Something that may not be desirable" (emphasis added).
When Senator Clairborne Pell asked Eugene Rostow, Director of the Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency, if either the U.S. or the Soviet Union could survive a nuclear war, Mr.
Rostow said, "the human race is very resilient." He then added, "Japan, after all, not only
survived but flourished after the nuclear attack." When he was asked what shape the coun-
try would be in if it did survive, he said: "There would be ten million dead on one side and
100 million on the other but," he added, "that is not the whole population." Hearings Before
the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations on Nomination of Eugene V Rostow, to be Director,
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 48-49 (1981) (statement of
Eugene V. Rostow) [hereinafter cited as Rostow Hearings].
Paul H. Nitze, currently chief arms negotiator in Geneva and a member of the United
States delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks, 1969-1974, said that there could be
serious arms control negotiations only after we've built up our forces. When asked how long
that will take, he said, "Ten years."
20. Secretary of State Alexander Haig, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, May 1I,
1982, N.Y. Times, May 12, 1982 at 8. See also The President's News Conference 17 WEEKLY
COMP. PREs. Doc. 66 (Jan. 29, 1981).
21. New Conference of March 31, 1982, N.Y. Times, April 1, 1982, at 22.
22. Mr. Mondale won election in Minnesota to the United States Senate in 1966. He was re-
elected in 1972. He was Vice President to President Jimmy Carter from 1977-1981. As Vice
President he was a member of the National Security Council from 1977-1981. Official Con-
gressional Directory 3, 474, 95th Cong., Ist Sess., (1977).
23. SALT II Hearings, supra note 10, at 99 (chart supplied by Secretary of Defense Harold
Brown).
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missiles are considered more accurate than the Soviets' ICBM mis-
siles.2u The Soviet bomber force is inferior to ours. Our nuclear missile
submarines are on station longer, are less vulnerable, and are more reli-
able than their Soviet counterparts.2 5 We are ahead of the Soviets in
anti-submarine warfare techniques. We have a wide range of new
weapons systems which can be used to deter Soviet aggression from
superior cruise missiles that can elude Soviet defenses to our unsur-
passed submarine missiles. We are clearly not behind the Soviet Union
in nuclear weapons technology. And to say that our forces are inferior
can only aid Soviet attempts to intimidate other nations, worry our al-
lies, and fuel the arms race.
An Unwinnable Race
It has been said that we could win an arms race with the Soviet
Union, and that if we only build more nuclear weapons systems, we
would remain safe from nuclear threat and attack.26 For thirty years
the United States has spent hundreds of billions of dollars on nuclear
weapons and shifted thousands of scientists from the productive private
sector of the economy to build increasing numbers of these weapons.
These billions of dollars have not ensured our safety. It does not en-
hance our nation's security that all the warheads in the world today
have a combined explosive force equal to four tons of TNT for every
man, woman, and child on earth.27 It does not enhance our security
that we and the Soviets have equipped our missiles with MIRVs.28
When I was in the Senate, a few of my colleagues and I tried to stop
the equipping of our missiles with MIRVs in the belief that MIRVs
would initiate a new level of escalation of the arms race, make arms
control more difficult, and force the Soviets to equip their missiles simi-
larly.29 Other Senators argued that the Soviets would need years to
catch up with us and would go broke trying to do so.30 We lost this
argument: the United States built MIRVs and within five years the
24. See Who's Really Ahead, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 12, 1982, at 20.
25. See id
26. See generally Rees, Why We Can't Afford a Nuclear Freeze, 25 AM. OPINION, June 1982, at 7.
27. A recently released study by the World Priorities organization put this figure at 3.5 tons TNT
for every person on earth. The study, entitled WORLD MILITARY AND SOCIAL EXPENDI-
TURES 1982, was authored by Ruth Leger Sivard, the director of World Priorities (a non-
ofit organization). Ruth Leger Sivard is the former chief of the economics division of the
.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.
28. A MIRV is a Multiple Independently Targeted Re-entry Vehicle-a nuclear missile weapon
system. The concept involves a launching rocket, a booster, and a final stage, called the bus,
from which several warheads can be fired at different speeds and on various trajectories
against different targets. 6 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA MIRV 932 (15th ed. 1974).
29. A group of congressmen, including Senator Mondale, drafted a research paper recom-
mending a number of cuts in the military budget, including funds targeted for deploying
MIRV warheads. N.Y. Times, June 16, 1970, at 9, col. 1.
30. For a complete treatment of the issues surrounding the original testing and deployment of
MIRVs, see generallyAB, MIR V SALT, And The NuclearArms Race: Hearings Before the
Subcorna on Arms Control, International Law and Organization of the Senate Commn. on
Foreign Affairs, 91 Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
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Soviets followed suit.3 ' The resulting defense problems for the United
States had only expensive solutions and our land-based missile systems
became much more vulnerable to a Soviet attack.32
The Soviets will do almost anything to match our increase in nu-
clear weapons and will not voluntarily concede nuclear superiority to
the United States. The arms race will not stop unless the two major
nuclear powers work together to. this end. Common sense and a decent
respect for humanity demand that we negotiate an end to the nuclear
arms race.
Real Security
The present administration tells us that the Soviets do not "deserve"
arms controls because they "misbehaved," and that we should punish
them by withholding this favor.3 3 Arms control is not a favor to the
Soviets. It is primarily something we do for ourselves. It is in our se-
curity interest as well as in theirs. By reducing counterforce weapons,
we could reduce the chance of surprise attack. By putting ceilings on
warheads and delivery systems, we could ease the tension on the nu-
clear trigger. By verifying the Soviet compliance, we could know what
the Soviets are up to. By restricting their nuclear activities, we could
better plan our own military improvements. By saving billions of dol-
lars in nuclear weaponry not built, we could spend more on conven-
tional forces and other programs.
These are direct boosts to our security. Moreover, a United States
that stands for arms negotiations would strengthen NATO solidarity.
A United States responsibly seeking arms control would have the
moral force to go to so-called threshold nations and ask them not to
add nuclear weapons to their arsenals. For all these reasons controlling
nuclear weapons makes us safer and not weaker.
During the Carter Administration, every one of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff-the heads of the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the
Marines-endorsed the SALT II Treaty in the belief that it would en-
31. The Department of Defense, in 1969, announced plans to test and deploy Minuteman 3 and
Poseidon missiles with MIRV warheads. N.Y. Times, June 14, 1969, at 8, col. 4.
In a news conference on January 14, 1975, Defense Secretary James Schlesinger reported
that the United States had confirmed deployment by the Soviets of MIRV missiles in under-
ground silos. This deployment, said Schlesinger, heralded the Soviet entry into the MIRV
field. N.Y. Times, Jan. 15, 1975, at I, col. 1. Yet, as early as 1969, Department of Defense
experts' analysis of Soviet tests in the Pacific indicated the Soviets were nearing development
of a MIRV system. N.Y. Times, June 9, 1969, at 1, col. 7.
32. An analysis of the Carter Administration's approach to arms limitation talks found Carter
policies reflected an acceptance of the long-standing contention of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
that the Soviet MIRVs could pose a threat to United States land based deterrent missiles.
N.Y. Times, Apr. 15, 1977, at 1, col. 5.
33. President Reagan said strategic arms negotiations with the Soviets would be linked to Soviet
global behavior. N.Y. Times, Jan. 30, 1980, at 3, col. 1. Later, in ordering this policy, Presi-
dent Reagan said Soviet involvement with the Salvadorian rebels must be "straightened out"
before arms control negotiations could proceed. N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 1980, at 4, col. 4.
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hance our security.34 Heads of intelligence agencies supported this
agreement because their jobs were to defend this country and they be-
lieved they could defend the country better with the Treaty than with-
out it.35
Of course, the Soviet Union has misbehaved. Yet, through thirty
years of wars and crises and Soviet misdeeds, every Administration has
sought agreements to reduce nuclear weapons. It is precisely when ten-
sions rise, when turmoil abounds, and when competition between the
super powers is heightened that we must work hardest to eliminate the
possibilities of nuclear war.
An Unwinnable War
Members of the Reagan Administration have even dared to suggest
that a nuclear war is winnable because it can be limited, we can protect
ourselves, and we can recover. In the six years of World War II some
fifty million people were killed.36 In an unlimited nuclear war that
many, twice as many, three times as many could be killed in an instant.
Many more would die from want of food or health care. The ozone
layer protecting us from dangerous solar radiation could be depleted,
soil rendered useless by contamination, water made undrinkable and a
planet perhaps uninhabitable. As someone once said, the living would
truly envy the dead.37
PROPOSALS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Evaluation of Arms Control Proposals
Every arms control proposal should be evaluated by the following
criteria:
(1) The proposal must lead to an outcome that will enhance the na-
tional security of both sides. No proposal can work that does not real-
istically lower the threat that each side faces.
(2) The proposal must focus on counterforce weapons. As the weap-
ons that threaten the weapons of the other side, these are the most de-
34. On July 11, 1979, the Joint Chiefs of Staff gave their formal support to the SALT II treaty in
their appearance before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. FACTS ON FILE 510
(1979).
35. The Treaty was supported by Adm. Noel Gaylor, former Director of the National Security
Agency, SALT11 Hearings, supra note 10, pt. 2, at 197, and William E. Colby, former Direc-
tor of the Central Intelligence Agency, id., pt. 5, at 268. Also, the then Director of the CIA,
Adm. Stansfield Turner, stated his confidence that the treaty provided for adequate ver-
ifiability of Soviet compliance with its terms. Id., pt. 3, at 276.
36. "The best estimates put the death roll as approximately 50,000,000." THE WORLD ALMANAC
BOOK OF WORLD WAR II 614 (P. Young ed. 1981).
37. Kinsley, Nuclear Holocaust in Perspective, HARPER'S, May 1982, at 8-12.
For further inquiry in to the effects of a nuclear attack, see OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY
ASSESSMENT, THE EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR (1979) (Report to Congress). See also, Short-
and Long-Term Health Effects on the Surviving Population of a Nuclear War: Hearing before
the Senate Subcomm. on Health and Scientpfc Research, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
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stabilizing nuclear arms, and they should be the first targets of
reduction.
(3) The proposal must aim for significant reductions in nuclear weap-
ons. For arms control to be successful, there must be hope that negoti-
ations can lead to a genuine, sizable reduction in destructive power.
(4) The proposal must lead to an outcome that can be effectively veri-
fied. Any agreement we seek must be independently verifiable by the
United States.
(5) Above all, the proposed agreement must strengthen America's se-
curity. No treaty will receive or deserve full bipartisan backing unless
the American people are convinced it fundamentally strengthens our
nation.
A Comprehensive Strategy
An additional criterion is that we must have a comprehensive secur-
ity strategy, not to put on the negotiating table, but to use for planning
both our defense needs and our approach to arms negotiations. The
military challenge we face today is not composed of isolated and dis-
tinct elements. The forces we contend with are not strategic or tactical
or conventional, but rather a combination of the three. What we need
to enhance our security is a comprehensive approach to arms reduc-
tions across the board. Instead of proceeding on a piecemeal basis, we
must look at the picture as a whole, discuss it with our allies, and nego-
tiate with it in mind. If we did this, we would have more leverage,
more flexibility, more negotiating room, and more opportunity to em-
phasize our military strengths. We would surely have more hope of
achieving arms control.
With a comprehensive strategy we could propose, for example, that
the Soviets reduce their conventional preponderance in Europe if we,
in turn, dropped our first use doctrine. We could abandon the MX if
the Soviets agreed to major cuts in the missiles that threaten our Min-
uteman silos. There are many other ways to relate reductions in their
forces to reductions in ours. Conversely, we cannot hope to reduce the
things the Soviets have that worry us unless we are prepared to discuss
seriously the things we have that worry them. Opponents of arms con-
trol often hide behind unbalanced proposals that the other side cannot
possibly accept. Shadow thus obscures substance.
Implementation
The nuclear freeze movement, Ground Zero Week, town meetings,
church resolutions, and other spontaneous grass-roots movements,
which I strongly support as a way to get the President's attention, have
begun to succeed. In the recent elections, nuclear freeze resolutions
[Vol. 10:1
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passed in eight out of the nine states where they were on the ballot.38
The Administration must take advantage of this building arms control
momentum to take several urgently needed steps.
The Administration should withdraw its opposition to the SALT II
Treaty, which should be swiftly ratified by the Senate. This treaty en-
hances verification, requires the dismantling of some 250 Soviet missile
delivery systems, 39 puts a so-called fractionation ceiling on the number
of warheads per delivery system,40 and prevents the Soviets from taking
advantage of their currently greater capacity to sharply increase the
numbers of deliverable warheads.4 This was why many military chiefs
supported SALT 11.42 The Reagan Administration must drop the loose
talk about tinkering with the Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty. That treaty
has been one of the few stabilizing and economizing forces in the arms
race.
The President must restore control of weapons-grade material and
return the American government to the side of nuclear non-prolifera-
tion. The passage of ever more nations from threshold to nuclear capa-
bility poses one of the most clear and dangerous threats to our long-
term security. The United States must also move ahead with conven-
tional force improvement and complete the conventional parity talks
now stalled in Vienna.43 The President must improve crisis communi-
cations, as Senators Sam Nunn (D-Ga.) and Henry Jackson (D-Wash.)
have urged,' to minimize the chance of accidental firing.
Above all, President Reagan must begin to exercise the leadership
so desperately needed if our country is to regain its proper role in the
world as the most powerful advocate for controlling nuclear weapons.
38. Nuclear freeze resolutions won overwhelming approval in various states across the nation
during the November 2, 1982 elections. The people of California, Massachusetts, Rhode
Island, New Jersey, North Dakota, Montana, Oregon, and Michigan all approved freeze
referenda. Only Arizona defeated a freeze referendum.
On a more local scale, the people of the cities of Chicago, Denver, Washington, D.C.,
Reno, and Olympia also supported nuclear freeze proposals. 'Freeze' Success Highlights Bal-
lot Measures, 40 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 2809 (1982).
39. SALTII Hearings, supra note 10, at 103 (statement of Harold Brown, Secretary of Defense,
accompanied by Ralph Earle II, Chairman, U.S. Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limita-
tion Talks).
40. "Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy systems for placing into Earth orbit
nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, including fractional
orbital missiles." SALT II Treaty, Art. IX, para. (1)(c). SALT !! Hearings, supra note 10.
41. ". . . These limits hold the Soviets down to a level well below what I believe Ithey] otherwise
could be expected to reach. For example, without SALT II I would expect them by 1985 to
have 1800 multiple-warhead missiles instead of 1200." SALT!! Hearings, supra note 10, at
115 (statement by Secretary of Defense Harold Brown).
42. See supra note 34.
43. See supra note 14.
44. "Jackson urges the U.S. and the Soviet Union to establish a jointly manned communications
center to ease what he called a growing concern that a nuclear war might be touched off by
accident." N.Y. Times, April 26, 1982, at 3, col. 4.
Two days later, Senator Sam Nunn stated he had been advocating such a plan for years.
N.Y. Times, April 28, 1982, at 24, col. 1.
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CONCLUSION
Nuclear war threatens everything we hold dear-our children, this
nation, this planet, and human life itself. To speak of nuclear weapons
is literally to consider the fate of the earth. To use them is to seal that
fate. To control them is to begin preserving what we cannot recreate
and what must be preserved.
As Jonathan Schell stated in his historic New Yorker articles:
Of all the modest hopes of human beings, the hope that mankind will
survive is the most modest, since it only brings us to the threshold of all
the other hopes. In entertaining it we do not yet ask for justice or for
freedom or for happiness or for any of the other things that we may
want in life. We do not even necessarily ask for our personal survival.
We only ask that we be survived. We ask for assurance that when we
die as individuals, as we know we must, mankind will live on.45
The survival of mankind is not too much to ask.
45. Schell, Refections." The Fate of Earth, NEW YORKER, Feb. 15, 1982, at 45-46. Mr. Schell
wrote two other articles which were published in the Feb. 1, 1982 and Feb. 8, 1982 editions of
NEW YORKER.
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